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Constructing a Global Polity: Theory, Discourse and Governance
Olaf Corry (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 256 pp., ISBN: 978-0230238756
I
n this original and stimulating book,
Olaf Corry sets out to find an alterna-
tive way of looking at the global. His
concern is that existing models lock us
into debates about the nature of an inter-
national system and limit us to seeing
things either as hierarchy or anarchy. The
challenge is to provide a model of struc-
ture that takes us beyond these two
alternatives, hence the idea of a global
polity.
The book looks at different ways of con-
ceiving of global polity. Rejecting the
orthodox international model that lurks
behind most recent accounts, Corry aims
to show how a particular global polity
discourse is constituted through discur-
sive practices rather than in addition to
something else like anarchy or hierarchy.
This is not to deny the importance of
states, but to shift the focus from state/
non-state to global/non-global. It is
defined by orientation to a governance
object that is predicated on framing the
world as one place. It depends on a shared
understanding that something can or
should be governed.
This leads to a discussion of what a
governmentality approach might offer. It
means rejecting the common use of
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governmentality by International Rela-
tions (IR) scholars which results in a
reworking of sovereign authority or the
scaling up of a liberal regime of power
knowledge. Rather than forcing a historical
account of liberal governmentality onto
global politics, this emergence should be
seen as something constitutive in its own
right. A focus on polity as a model of
political structure means examining the
emergence of global governable objects.
Corry opposes the idea that govern-
mentality expresses some underlying
ontology arguing that Marxist readings of
Foucault, such as mine, reduce govern-
mentality to the implementation of liberal
capitalist development, denying that
practices, mentalities and discourses are
constitutive in themselves. He suggests
that, while Foucault shows how govern-
mentality provides the conditions of pos-
sibility for the emergence of modern
liberal societies, here it is the other way
around with social structures held to pro-
vide the conditions of possibility for gov-
ernmental rule.
Corry argues that the wrong response
to the critics is to simply claim that global
governmentality is more successful than
the doubters perceive. We have an over-
estimation of global governmentality in
the first case, underestimation in the sec-
ond. Both approaches mistakenly start
from what actual institutions are doing
and then measure their success or failure,
whereas a better way to understand glo-
bal governmentality is by examining how
governance is problematised and how
domains of governance are established.
Instead of arguing over the degree to
which the world has been governmenta-
lised, we should examine those mental-
ities of governance that presuppose the
world as one place.
I would certainly accept Corry’s argu-
ment that we should look at the way that
governance problematises global subjects
and objects, and in advancing the notion
of global polity, this book makes a major
contribution. I disagree that this is an
either/or issue. Otherwise approaches
such as mine are bound to fail because
they do not conform to a pure model.
Hence, I do not agree with the claim that
polity is constituted not by a hierarchy
among subjects but their orientation
towards a common object because how
this orientation is decided or indeed con-
stituted in the first place is a hierarchical
issue. Indeed, this is half accepted when
Corry says: ‘Just as there are many hier-
archies, some more important than
others, governance-objects are multiple
but only a limited number define the poli-
tical landscape’ (p. 90). That only a lim-
ited number can succeed is due to the
hierarchical nature of the existing system,
something realists and Marxists explain in
terms of hegemony. While I agree that
polity is usefully understood as ‘orienta-
tion towards a common object’, I believe
that the nature of both the orientation and
the common object is decided by hierar-
chy defined as ‘subordination between
subjects’ (p. 99).
While I am almost prepared to accept
the suggestion that my position brings me
close to the mainstream neoliberal IR
research agenda and its focus on the
effects of international institutions and
regimes, I would not want to see my
understanding of the regulation of states
limited to such models, as must be
the case if I follow Corry’s advice and
separate hierarchical models from polity
ones. Corry suggests that a study of
European polity should focus on how
actors orientate themselves around the
governance of Europe through the notion
of a shared (if contested) discourse. How-
ever, this surely begs the question of the
type of actors involved, and therefore
makes the question of whether the state
is still in control just as important as
the question of which new entities are
emerging.
In conclusion, this book’s focus on glo-
bal polity is extremely important. It
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means that I will end up doing exactly
what Corry probably does not want: read-
ing it in my own way and making use of
the important insights insofar as they
supplement my own focus on states,
regimes, power politics and hegemony.
RESPONSE TO JOSEPH
The main aim of Constructing a Global
Polity is to provide another point of depar-
ture for analysing global politics to supple-
ment hierarchy and anarchy. Structure in
IR depends not only on the arrangement
of actors but also on changing objects of
governance. A ‘global polity’ is thus not
equivalent to global hierarchy and the
disappearance of sovereign states. Rather
it depends on objects rendered govern-
able that reference the world as one place.
The global climate has, for example,
recently emerged as an object of knowl-
edge, a target of manipulation and of
political struggle. Such objects, I argue,
can have structuring effects on world pol-
itics, effects that are not picked up on if we
only ask ‘who governs?’.
In his perceptive review of my book,
Jonathan Joseph raises some excellent
points. First, while he intends to use ele-
ments of my global polity theory to sup-
plement his own focus on states and
hegemony he cautions that ‘the nature of
both the orientation and the common
object [of a polity] is decided by hierarchy
defined as “subordination between sub-
jects” ’. A polity model therefore cannot
stand alone without analysing power
differences.
This is undoubtedly true, and Joseph’s
timely book makes a strong case for rein-
serting hegemony into discourses of glo-
bal governance. However, my model does
not deny the importance of unequal power
relations. Polities are not defined by hier-
archy although there will inevitably be
power differences within them. This goes
for ‘anarchies’ and ‘societies’ too: we
identify them by other features than their
hierarchical structures. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that polities are
‘decided by hierarchy’. The emergence of
the global climate as a governance-
object, for instance, cannot be under-
stood by focussing on ‘subordination
between subjects’ alone. Consider the
relatively subordinate actors such as
scientists and environmentalists, or the
circulation of iconic globalist images of
earth from space, the gradual growth of
globalist infrastructure including a global
network of metrological monitoring sta-
tions, and myriad other processes often
undertaken for reasons totally unrelated
to climate or global hegemony. Together
they have led to the emergence of a global
object of governance and thus contribu-
ted to the conditions of possibility for a
global polity. Just like the Copernican
revolution, a global polity is an emergent
phenomenon – the result of a messy pro-
cess rather than the deliberate product of
a hegemon. Power is an integral part of
the social, but the analytical model of
hierarchy should not be our only starting
point or picture of political structure.
Second, Joseph cautions that ‘the ques-
tion of whether the state is still in control’
is ‘just as important as the question of
which new entities are emerging’. Again,
he is right: the dominant type of actor is of
major significance to the politics of any
polity. However, whether new objects of
governance are emerging is central to
their constitution and this dimension is
currently excluded from models of politi-
cal structure. My claim was explicitly not
that states do not matter (pp. vii, viii, 1, 9
and 11), but rather that it matters to the
structure of world politics what actors are
trying to be in control of (and, if we begin
from there, the world looks somewhat
different). This is no longer just their own
domestic spheres or other states but also
non-geographical objects that reference
the world as one place. Globality is social
indeed.
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In sum, Joseph and I agree that the
international is not a self-constituting
immutable reality, but a product of social
processes and that global governmental-
ity is not a world-spanning liberal regime.
My polity model provides a new analytical
starting rather than end point, but the
relevant actors and their power relations
must be analysed to make sense of a
given polity. Most importantly, the entities
analysed should not be limited to the ones
visible to the usual structural models that
ignore what is being governed. Contrary
to what he suspects, I am therefore more
than happy for Joseph to be analysing the
formation of polities, even if we partially
differ on how to study hegemony within
them.
The Social in the Global: Social Theory, Governmentality and Global Politics
Jonathan Joseph (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 320 pp.,
ISBN: 978-1107022904
O
nesource of inspiration for current
IR theory is Foucault’s notion of
‘governmentality’, usually used to
critique realist and liberal understandings
of power beyond the domestic setting. In
The Social in the Global, Jonathan Joseph
advances a historical materialist approach
that, while avowedly not Foucauldian,
makes use of governmentality pitched as
a complementary tool for understanding
how international hegemonic projects are
made to work. Joseph sets out to provide
‘a detailed account of how neoliberalism
works through the governance aspect and
its micro-level operations’ (p. 41), but
also wants to ‘put governmentality in its
place’ (p. 23) in relation to ‘deeper’ levels
of social reality.
Governmentality refers to ‘how govern-
ing is more deep-rooted in ways of seeing,
thinking and acting’ (p. 11), but Joseph
deliberately limits it to ‘specifically liberal
forms of governance that operate through
the promotion of freedom, governing from
a distance and limitation of government’
(p. 16). It is also treated as an ‘emergent
phenomenon … it is not the underlying
rationality that underpins all other aspects
of the social’ (p. 262). These ‘other
aspects’ are primarily ‘underlying capital-
ist social relations’ (p. 263), but also the
state system and the hegemonic projects
within it. Compared with hegemony, ‘gov-
ernmentality is better at showing the spe-
cific techniques and technologies of
power’, not least at the micro-level, but
hegemony has ‘the better connection to
the social context’ (p. 41).
With this stall set out, Joseph presents a
critique of social theories such as risk
society, global governance, civil society
and the globalisation literature. He casts
them not as innocent theories, but as
governmentalities used in shaping and
legitimating practices of global govern-
ance in line with neoliberal interests,
obfuscating ‘the true nature of the capi-
talist world system’ (p. 240). The second
part of the book analyses how the World
Bank and the EU inflict neoliberal rule on
poor countries and Western populations
using liberal ideas of ‘responsibility,
reflection, ownership and partnership’
(p. 211).
The analyses of World Bank and EU
discourse provide a useful overview of
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neoliberal governance and highlight the
institutional co-option of some otherwise
popular social theories. The idea that gov-
ernmentality will necessarily function dif-
ferently in different contexts is also
important. Uneven and combined devel-
opment is an effective antidote to any glib
‘the world is flat’ notions of globality,
including the idea that ‘global governmen-
tality’ is a uniform and free-floating world-
wide liberal regime of power. However,
neoliberal governmentality in interna-
tional organisations has to a certain
extent been documented before, social
theory is only one source of it, and posit-
ing governmentality as a junior partner to
Marxism somewhat limits its usefulness.
First, the way governmentality is con-
sidered emergent rather than constitutive
clears space for the author’s preferred
underlying ontology of class, capitalist
production and the state system, but it
does not facilitate analysis of how these
may themselves in part be constituted
by governmentalities. Despite capitalism
also consisting of ideational factors such
as property rights, governmentality is
considered distinct from ‘the wider, dee-
per picture’ (p. 30) and is put ‘in its place’
(p. 23). Pre-empting such critique, Joseph
suggests governmentality maintains its
‘own dynamics’ pointing to a revival of
the state in the post-Washington Consen-
sus as evidence. But even this came about
by ‘structural conditions of capital accu-
mulation, global markets, security issues
and global unevenness’ (p. 65). The
debate is framed as governmentalities
versus the social, rather than asking how,
for instance, production processes and
the state system are partly made up of
governmentalities.
Second, why is governmentality neces-
sarily liberal, governing only through free-
dom? This leads Joseph to overlook
competing and alternative governmental-
ities (despite his explicit aim to promote
resistance). Governmentality more use-
fully refers to a general analytic focusing
on any rationality that conducts conduct
through ways of seeing, thinking and act-
ing. Otherwise, ‘global governmentality’ is
clearly a misnomer: there is no totalising
worldwide liberal regime. Equally, liberal-
ism is not the only game in town in the
West and ‘ways of seeing, thinking and
acting’ are important in non-liberal socie-
ties too.
Drawing attention to the ‘context’ of
governmentalities is thus important and
Joseph draws on a powerful social theory
to do so. However, combining theories is
notoriously challenging, and by handing
the key to governmentality decisively to
its context understood through another
theory, the possibility of analysing impor-
tant changes and resistances through the
former becomes limited. The state system
and capitalism are taken as given,
whereas the global is deemed ‘an illusion’
(p. 21) – albeit a very powerful one obfus-
cating the uneven reality of the interna-
tional. More interesting is how the global
is being constituted as a social reality,
and, through this configuring, how world
politics and liberalism themselves are
being reconstituted.
At times, Joseph’s use of governmental-
ity is broadly compatible with the concept
of ideology understood as a structure of
meaning that reinforces, but relies on,
underlying social configurations of power.
This is not without value but raises the
question of what is ultimately gained by
referencing Foucault whose project was
precisely to explore the constitutive role
of discourses, their role in resistance and
in relation to multiple rationalities.
RESPONSE TO CORRY
I wish to respond by outlining two key
issues relating to how I see governmen-
tality. The first is governmentality’s place
in a wider social ontology, the other
relates to its liberal character. This is not
an attempt to provide the most ‘truthful’
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reading of Foucault, but an outline of what
I consider to be the most useful applica-
tion to international politics.
On the first issue, Corry correctly notes
that I treat governmentality as an emer-
gent phenomenon rather than a deep
underlying rationality. I argue that it is
underpinned by a particular set of social
conditions connected to the development
of the capitalist economy and to various
configurations of hegemony within it.
With such an argument, I am always
likely to antagonise my audience. For
Foucauldians this is likely to be seen as
falsely positing an underlying capitalist
reality while seeing governmentality as
something that is instrumentally put to
use by various social groups. When talk-
ing to Gramscians, I would wish to
emphasise the opposite – that govern-
mentality is not something that can be
simply taken up and used. It pre-exists
the social groups who engage with it and
helps condition and shape the types of
hegemonic strategies that can emerge.
As Corry acknowledges, I do in part wish
to examine the constitutive powers of
governmentality, but I do not believe that
these powers are constitutive all the way
down. In the shape of capitalist social
relations, they come up against some sig-
nificantly different social phenomena that
place significant limits on their constitu-
tive powers.
Adopting a critical realist ontology that
sees the social world as made up of strati-
fied social relations, I argue that govern-
mentality has a particular place within the
social formation. To take the best known
passage from Foucault (2007) as our
guide, governmentality is an ‘ensemble
formed by institutions, procedures, ana-
lyses, and reflections, the calculations and
tactics that allow the exercise of this
very specific, albeit very complex, power’
(108). Again emphasising specificity,
Foucault (2007) describes a type of power
called government ‘which has led to
the development of a series of specific
governmental apparatuses … and knowl-
edges’ (108). And again he takes a speci-
fic focus on how the state of justice of the
Middle Ages became the administrative
state in the fifteenth century and was then
gradually governmentalised (2007: 109).
Of course it is possible to play games
with different passages from Foucault in
order to read him in such a way that fits
with our own ontology. However, I think it
is quite clear from these passages that
Foucault is talking about something that
exists in a particular form and particular
space and that if I translate this into the
language of critical realism, he is not talk-
ing about deeper social structures, nor
even a deeper discursive realm or epis-
teme, but a domain of institutions, tactics
and procedures. Without wishing to push
my own particular approach too strongly, I
would say that the issue at stake is
whether one wants to have a social ontol-
ogy of different stratified layers, or
whether one is happy with an ontology
that is limited to institutions, procedures
and tactics. My own reading of interna-
tional politics is that it is difficult to say
much about how institutions, procedures
and tactics work in different ways in dif-
ferent places unless we have an under-
lying ontology that looks at conditions of
possibility. It is not just about how gov-
ernmentality constitutes, but how it is
itself constituted. I read this as not as
governmentality versus the social but
governmentality as emergent from the
social.
This is what leads me to focus on gov-
ernmentality as liberal. Of course it can be
much more than this, but as I do not see
governmentality existing ‘all the way
down’, the interesting issue is how it
interacts with and is influenced by the
dominant power relations within the inter-
national system. While governmentality
may well take many forms, if the domi-
nant states and international organisa-
tions are of a liberal nature, then this is
bound to be reflected in the type of
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governmentality that is promoted. This is
not to deny that more organic forms of
governmentality might emerge in differ-
ent places, but in the international realm it
reflects hierarchy and power politics. In
my initial review, I noted that Corry recog-
nises hierarchy, but wishes to find an
alternative model that takes us beyond
this. My argument is that it is impossible
to do this.
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